Ethnic Inclusion as a Peace Strategy

Lars-Erik Cederman
Professor of International Conflict Research

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Responses to ethnic diversity

- Strengthen state capacity & minimize opportunities of rebellion

- Address grievances through ethnic inclusion

Predominance

Partition

Power sharing

Party politics
Debate on power sharing (PS) and conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In favor:</th>
<th>Against:</th>
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</table>
| - PS reduces grievances and conflict  
  - Governmental PS facilitates interethnic cooperation by socializing elites (e.g. Lijphart)  
  - Territorial PS makes it easier to find compromise solutions in heterogeneous polities (e.g. McGarry & O’Leary; Hechter) | - PS polarizes and deepens conflict  
  - Governmental PS cements ethnic differences and is inefficient and undemocratic (e.g. Horowitz; Roeder)  
  - Territorial PS deepens divides and fuels separatist conflict (e.g. Snyder; Bunce; Roeder) |
Problems haunting the power sharing literature

- Selective samples
- Narrow focus on formal institutions
- Separate focus on either governmental or territorial PS
- Endogeneity
Explaining postcolonial conflict

Underestimating pacifying effect of inclusion

**Initial Inclusion**

- **French**
- **British**

**Predicted Probability**

- Distance from coast (logarithm)

**Density**

- Change in conflict probability

- Model 3
- Model 4
- naïve

- with reverse causation
Power sharing and autonomy before and after conflict

Ethnic inclusion through a regime of accommodation?

- Group rights
- Territorial power sharing
- Governmental power sharing
- Democracy
- Peacekeeping

Ted Robert Gurr
Probability of conflict ending, 2004-2005

End of Discrimination

Regional Autonomy

Inclusion

Democratization

Peacekeeping

Non-Accommodated, Accommodated, Predicted Change
## Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Onset</th>
<th>Group rights</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Power sharing</th>
<th>Democratization</th>
<th>Peace Keeping</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia, Nigeria</td>
<td>Kurds in Iraq</td>
<td>South Africa, Angola</td>
<td>Guatemala, Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ending</td>
<td>Tuaregs in Mali, Niger</td>
<td>N. Ireland, Aceh</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### South Africa
![Image of Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk]

### Northern Ireland
![Image of the Good Friday Agreement]

### Macedonia
![Image of a UN peacekeeping mission]
Relevance for Latin America

- Dramatic political and economic inequality
- Indigenous and African-descendant population discriminated
- Democratization has reduced discrimination and promoted regional autonomy rather than power sharing (e.g. Van Cott & Lee 2001)
- Ethnic mobilization has had emancipating and stabilizing effect (Vogt 2015)
Trend toward inclusion around the world
Trends of inclusion in world regions
The Diffusion of Ethnic Inclusion?

- Cederman, Gleditsch & Wucherpfennig

- Ethnic inclusion increasingly common
- Is this due to processes within polities or does power sharing diffuse?

- Closed polity model:
  - Ethnic diversity, democracy, conflict management

- Open polity model:
  - World polity model
  - Neighborhoods (regional or global)
Diffusion of ethnic inclusion

2010

- Dominance
- Power Sharing
- Ethnicity Irrelevant
Transitions to inclusion/exclusion by regional neighborhood

Shift to inclusion

Shift to exclusion

Inclusion in neighborhood

Inclusion in neighborhood
Conclusions

- Governmental PS reduces conflict
- Territorial PS reduces conflict esp. together with governmental PS
- Group rights and democratization can also reduce conflict

- Ethnic inclusion increasing in most parts of the world
- Ethnic inclusion diffuses among neighboring states and within world regions

- Open questions: Specific mechanisms? Conditions of partition? Grievance reduction in non-ethnic civil wars?